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The rise and fall of the mind in western and India philosophies, 
 
Purushottama Bilimoria  
 
Preamble 
Psychoanalysis regards everything mental as primarily unconscious in the first place. 
The quality of consciousness may or may not be present. Therefore, the unconscious 
is a constant state which is visited by the conscious mind. Even in sleep and deep 
sleep states our unconscious mind is activate.  Freud sets up a template for various 
levels of consciousness, reaching deep into the unconscious. But how deep?  
 
In the Indian tradition of The Yoga Sutras, Patanjali also claims that there are three 
levels of the mind- buddhi, manas and ahamkara. Buddhi is the conscience and it 
disciplines  sensory desires of the lower minds. Manas is the sensory realm of the 
mind; the desiring part. Ahamkara is the identity or ego. Patanjali has a theory of 
klesas  that just look like a bundle of unconscious sedimentations. 
 
But what, if any, is the possible connection between Freud and Patanjali at a more 
theoretic level?  Has mind a spiritual quality in Freud as it is in Patanjali, or is purely 
physical and material – as Larson claims this to be eliminative-style move in 
Samkhya, and by implication in Yoga? If consciousness is reduced or reductively 
explained as the function of myriads of neurons, receptors, molecules, and cells 
bombarding one another, then what does this explanatory and causal model do or 
augur for the unconsciousness, which is at least modeled on a non-physical psyche or 
even language (as in Lacan)? Is the unconscious as light as a ball of *cottonwool*, 
easy of levitation? 
 
These are some of the issues I wish to address in this short essay. But let me begin 
with some general reflections on the nature of consciousness and where current 
studies are leading us towards; I will begin with Descartes and make a detour through 
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the Nyaya view. I will then return, not to Patanjali’s Yoga as such, but to Ramanuja’s 
yoga of consciousness to explore some aspects of the unconscious as understood in 
the Vedanta tradition. I will conclude with an alternative proposal of a ‘mentalese in 
qualia only’. 
 
I. Descartes’s Substance Dualism 
 
René Descartes started his search for truth and wisdom with an examination of the 
human mind; the house of our conscious and unconscious thoughts.1 Descartes 
claimed  that nothing can be proven unless all doubt is removed from the mind. Who 
am I? He further claimed that the essence of a human being is to be found in the fact 
that he/she can think. A revolutionary thinker or his time, Descartes decided that in 
order to establish just what defines human essence, we must question the very 
foundations of human existence. After all, how do we really know the truth about 
anything? Descartes suggested that for all we know, we might be the victims of a 
malicious demon2 who tricks us into accepting things as reality that are, in fact, 
illusions. It is from this skeptical perspective that Descartes decided to establish his 
argument.  So through a series of personal meditations (intellectual contemplation 
rather than mantric repetition), he proceeded to examine traditional thought, 
deliberately raising doubts about all of his own pre-existing ideas and personal 
beliefs.  
 
When Descartes decided to question the groundwork of human existence he was 
compelled to ask: How do I know what is real? In order to build some sort of concrete 
notion of reality, Descartes set out on a personal exploration, stripping himself of all 
of his previously accepted tenets ie: I am a man ... My senses demonstrate the 
truth....There is a God... He then proceeded to ask questions such as: Who am I? Do 
the things I experience through my senses really exist or are they simply imagined? 
How can I prove the existence of God? Descartes surmised:  
 
                                                            
1Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Translated by John Cottingham, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993; first published in 1986.                                                                                   
2Descartes, ibid, p. 23. 
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I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish 
everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted 
to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.3  
 
At this point everything became a giant question mark. For Descartes, all his 
preconceived thoughts needed to be proven - all of the things he formerly accepted 
uncritically could not be perceived as reality. It is this process of doubting which is 
referred to as Descartes' 'method of doubt4', doubt plays a crucial role in his quest to 
discover what defines the essence of a human being.  
 
Descartes concluded that the intellect is the essential key to true knowledge. He 
therefore separates the mind from the senses (sensory perception). Descartes argues 
that our senses can deceive. For instance, not everything we see is an adequate 
reflection of how things actually are. Descartes gives the example of the distorted 
shape of a stick when seen in water. The jagged appearance of a stick recognized by 
visual perception is not the true state of the stick. By using the discerning part of the 
mind  we realize the true nature of the stick.  
 
In the process proving that a human being is, in essence, a thinking thing, Descartes' 
explored the relationship between body and mind. He explained that a human being is 
made up of two different substances: matter (body; the material world) and mind 
(intellect; the non-material world ). He used the term substance dualism5 to describe 
this.  
 
After exploring the credibility of his senses and his intellect, Descartes felt he was in a 
position to declare what he could know for certain. After lengthy meditation he came 
to the conclusion that the first thing that he could be absolutely sure of was the fact 
that he was doubting, therefore because he was doubting he must exist. Descartes also 
concluded that he was doubting through a process of thought therefore, he must be a 
                                                            
3Descartes, ibid, p12. 
4 Reason & Experience; Theories of Knowledge A Study Guide, 
published by Deakin University, Geelong, 1996; first published 1989, p.20. 
7 Ibid, p.59. 
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thinking thing. Consequently, Descartes considered that he had established a certainty 
‘I doubt, therefore I am thinking, therefore I exist’6. 
 
‘I think,  therefore I am.’ 
 
So in effect Descartes identified the mind with consciousness, the principle of 
awareness, or vice versa. Consciousness is of the essence of the mind, albeit as a 
substance that is non-corporeal and absolutely distinct and separate from the corporeal 
body. The mental, or thought substances are bound in part to the material body senses 
(res extensa, possessing of primary qualities); but the perceptions from these thought 
processes, res cogitans  are secondary in kind.  In separating the material from the 
mental, Descartes was moved to make this profound observation: 
 
“now, when I am beginning to achieve a better knowledge of myself and the 
author of my being… that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart 
from another… I can infer directly that my essence consists solely of the fact 
that I am a thinking thing…it is certain that I (that is my soul, by which I am 





Consciousness as the ‘mental’ is also a way of underscoring our essential subjectivity: 
that is to say, there is a domain of experience within the life of each individual which 
is circumscribed by a deeply-felt subjectivity – the capacity of thought, pure 
intellectual ideas, some even profoundly innate, and the subject as the locus and 
owner of a range of experiences, which remain, for most part, private and internal, 
coded in memory and the individual self’s own language-game, as it were. And it is 
what also stamps the ownership of propriety of these experiences as belonging to a 
distinct ‘I’, (Freud’s Id), ‘mine’, ‘me’, ‘I am seeing  the table.’. There are, as 
psychonalaysis has amply shown, several dimensions and levels of this subjectivity: 
conscious and unconscious, subconscious, possibly as consciousness in some quaint 
                                                            
6 Descartes, ibid, p.17. 
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sense that survives the individual’s death, at least in her works and in the memories of 
others left behind. One of the enduring virtues of the Descartes’ model is that by 
focusing on the mental , the ‘ghost inside’, it kept the challenge of the inexorable 
subjective in the fore-front and it has continued to rear its cinematic head to critique 
unbending naturalist accounts. Many traditions have wondered who is the ‘I’ that sees 
and hears, that listens and speaks, that thinks and writes, and even thinks about 
thinking? So in some, , in the Cartesian model, it is a mental non-material substance 
(incorporeal mind tied to a spiritual self) that is separate and independent of the 
corporeal body (physical matter, biological nervous system and brain), that makes 
possible this self-consciousness of an extended being (res extensa) amidst all the 
furniture of the universe.  
 In any event, it is to the ‘mind’ that Descartes’ rationalism leads, as he sets out 
to complete the paradigm of knowledge that has established ‘that there is something 
special – something non-natural – about the human mind; that the individual has 
special and authoritative access to his own consciousness’.8 Descartes anchors the 
essence, the mind, the rational soul of his ‘thinking thing’ to an intellectual basis, 
which means intellectus purus, pure understanding. 
 
However, there is a deep problem with this model. Ontological or substance dualis 
has not got us very far, and if anything – going by current wisdom in Philosophy – has 
rather got in the way of clear thinking in respect of this inquiry. The problem has not 
so much been in what we have been led to believe on the mind (or the broadly 
spiritual) side of the equation but in respect of the tacit intuition about the material 
substance. As David Ray Griffin has pointed out (rephrased by George Shields,9) that 
the Cartesian formula of res extensa as representing the essence of matter has 
impacted on both the materialist and the dualist traditions alike: “(S)ince 
consciousness has been regarded as the opposite of extended matter, those who 
presuppose Cartesian matter are then logically forced into two divergent paths, each 
rife with difficulty and paradox: either completely reduce consciousness to extended 
matter (or eliminate consciousness entirely) or ontologically separate it from the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (1999),  p 54 
8  R M Gaskin, ‘The case for Cartesianism’, in Reason and Experience: Theories of 
Knowledge, Study Guide, Victoria: Deakin University. 1988, p 12 
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material domain. On the first option, we end up with a most implausible denial of the 
reality of consciousness and its qualia, and, on the second, we give up naturalism and 
thus introduce notions of occult agency (among other perplexities).’    
 
II. Nyaya Dualism with Reversed Extensa 
Now let us look at the Nyaya view. This is best represented in the Nyaya of the 
Middle Period represented by Jayanta, Udayana, Bhasarvajña, and the author of 
Bhasa-parichheda.10 However, here I will discuss Kisor Chakrabarti’s11 recent 
distilled reformulation of the classical and middle period Nyaya position as it is also 
more accessible in the Cartesian language we have begun with. The Nyaya shifts the 
burden of extension (vibhu)  from material substance to the non-material substance 
called atma (self). Atma is pervasive: although not all-pervasive, and hence has limits 
to its pervasiveness, because it is basically atomistic in the Nyaya formulation, and all 
atomistic entities have their own unique dimensions of time-space. (Hence also the 
difference between Nyaya atmA  (feminine gendered) and Vedantic atman (neuter) 
which is one and the same as Brahman, the all-perpvasive infinite Being-over-being).  
It is to be noted specially that what we might call ‘mind’ in Indian philosophy, manas, 
is placed squarely on the side of the material (the body-senses complex), and the 
subjective is placed on the side of the spiritual self (atma). Apart from these – rather 
significant differences – the basic the facticity of dualism works in the more or less 
the same way in both models.  In order words, consciousness is supervenient on the 
self, not on the corporeal body, even if some causal factors (asadharanakarana)  are 
necessary to trigger or ‘awaken’ consciousness from its zoombie-like slumber in the 
bossom of the self. The atma  having the property of extension and not the material 
substance is instructive (for my own derivative position as well), and this provides 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9 George W Shields, review of David Ray Griffin (1998), Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, 
Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. (Berkeley: University of California Press),  in Sophia vol 40 no 
2. December 2001, pp. 67-72, p. 67. 
10  I have discussed this period and its quaint occultism in a paper on ‘Prameyas (things, events) and J 
L Shaw on avayavipratyaksa in the Nyåya and the troubled ontology of Middle Nyaya Realism’, 
forthcoming in a volume on The Philosophy of Jay L Shaw, Kolkata (details withheld). 
11 Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti (1999) Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition 
(Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 210-211. Kisor hails from an ancestry of distillers 
who by the time of the British sahibs gave us the best of distilled Bengali Rum. It is this first pukka  
alcoholic drink to arrive in Australia, that rendered its White-settler community into near-zoombie like 
state, and understandably heralded, a century on, among the staunchest realist following in the 
philosophical camp ever to walk the face of the earth. Realists such as David Armstrong consulted 
Kisor when re-inventing the medieval theory of real universals, but dismissed the Nyaya position on 
universals as being ‘rather nominalist’ (Personal conversation with Armstrong after the departure of 
Kisor on a short fellowship at the University of Sydney).   
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some resolution to the kinds of problems that have been raised with Descartes’ 
insistence that it is the body alone that has res extensa. How can an inert substance-
base extend all the way out to the distant stars that we see on a clear night, but which 
are not there at this moment since they may well have exploded into nothingness by 
now? And how do the senses bring back the fine sound of speech and the subtle 
vibrations of music? But then a spiritual substance that shares no properties with 
essentially physical things with physical properties – the light of the distant now 
extinct stars, the vibrations of sound, the rasa of massala-dosa or of Bengali macchi, 
perhaps even real universals, etc., -- be causally capable of interacting, interjecting 
itself with doses of what relative to its own self-nature (svabhava) would be rather 
gross impressions of the dravya of matter? While in Descartes’ case the causal 
interaction problem was posed inside or within the ambience of the corporeal body 
(hence the dubious solution of the pineal glands), in the case of Nyaya (and with all 
views that ascribe extension to non-corporeal sunstance), the causal interaction 
problem is deferred to a location (or pervasion perhaps) exceeding way beyond the 
tender-ends of the sensory organs – in fact, in the locus of the object of perception and 
sensory reception itself (the cat on the mat, whether present or absent), the distant 
stars, the universals grasped in one sweep of the visible beauty of the cosmos, etc, etc.  
The same problem of causality remains. Neither the Cartesian nor the Nyaya reversal 
gets us out of this paradox, as both are anxious to reduce consciousness in the 
direction of the purely spiritual, the ‘occult agency’, without providing a satisfactory 
answer to the major question of how can substances of entirely different nature or 
kind be said to interact at all?   
 
In other words, it is laudable that that we are asked to recognize this unique 
suggestion coming from the Nyaya: namely, that, unlike as in Cartesian dualism 
where it is  the material substance (the body and its sense-organs) that has extension, 
in the Nyaya, it is the essence of the self, the non-material substance, that has vibhu or 
(literally ‘extensional pervasion’)  that makes possible this extension.12  But how 
exactly this inversion of the source of extension helps solve problems in dualism is 
                                                            
12 I have discussed this view in detail in another paper (unpublished), ‘Extra-sensorial liaisons of 4D 
Yogins : enigma extolled by Nyaya; impeachable to Mimamsas’, a view best expounded in 
Visvantha’s Bhasa-Pariccheda. The mystical disembodied (or twin) self extended to other, even 
distant, egological bases is rendered as vibhuti, and may claim to itself yogic awareness of others’ 
mental states, notwithstanding problems of individuation, confusion of ego-identities, and zealous 
expropriations.   
  8 
not clear.13 There is a same old causal impasse here as in the Cartesian (or any other) 
model of mind-body dualism qua realist ontology (as distinct from aspectual or 
discourse dualisms). The analogy of my thought moving the pen (or to a post-
modernist, the act of writing re-inscribing ideas in the head) will not work in the 
context of accounting for how the mental or spiritual substance, which has none of the 
properties of matter (and cannot even be said to occupy space for that matter or spirit), 
could move the physical (or vice versa), and not just whisk right through the physical 
base (body, brain, pineal point) as low-frequency radio waves do without necessarily 
breaking into sound or noise at every point. We are left with an unworkable 
epiphenomenalism.  The concept of intentionality captures at least part of of the 
problem of the extensional orientation, but surely the function of intentionality would 
appear to be centrally located neither in an inactive atma  nor in a non-extentional 
Cartesian mind; in part this would seem to belong to the manas in the Nyaya theory, 
and in part to the embodied mind of the Cartesian variety in extensia. A manasic mind 
would be a more plausible conception, and I have some sympathy with this hydrized 
phenomenon (e.g. it is plausible via Bollywood that ‘man-me-man lagan hochuka aur 
magan-bhi aabeitha: mind-in-mind and amorous fidelity infused’). But all of this 
might be too prolix; in the interest of parsimony, it would be far simpler to attribute 
intentionality to a set of mentalese qualia that are not arrested by the weight of any 
occult entity – such as atma  or Mind – and is free to, as it were, to wonder and 
wander in and out of the embodied binding identity that the apperception of the 
qualias-in-temporality provides it with also (aham-pratyaya).  
 
III The Occult Excesses 
Moreover, ascribing states of consciousness to the disembodied self (atma)  as a 
property (guna) or qualia  – which is really the heart of the Nyaya account of 
consciousness - presents the further difficulty of separately establishing the existence 
of atma, which is an even more formidable challenge than establishing a non-
materialistic Cartesian mind. It is interesting though that the Nyaya ‘mind’ (manas)  is 
more akin to the Aristotelian  communis sensus (the ‘common sense’) than it is to the 
Cartesian mind, as it is described  virtually as the sixth sense-organ and yet distinct 
from the body and its basic sense-organs. However, locating the mind as a cognitive-
                                                            
13 See Patrick Foster’s review of Kisor Chakrabarti in Sophia vol 40 no 2 December 2001, pp. 73-75 
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affective hermes or conduit in some nebulous space between the given material 
substance (constituting the body and its sense-organs) and a supposed spiritual 
substance does not resolve the problem of a more plausible explanation of just how it 
is that two entirely and essentially different kinds of substance can work through a 
medium that does not share the properties (fully or even partially) of one side of the 
divide. Just the same problems arise for other Indian accounts: in respect of the ‘inner 
sense’ antahkarana  in Vedanta, ‘intelligence’, manas-citta in Samkya-Yoga, and in 
Mimamsa with its own variant concept of the ‘mind-function’,  manapratyaya, 
although not a supplemental sense-organ. There is something missing here in all these 
accounts; and what is missing is not some thing but an explanation of the transparency 
of atma (spiritual self-substratum) to the body qua mind and vice versa. It is often said 
that at death the atma, like the electricity in the table lamp,  departs from the body, 
and cripples or renders dysfunctional the mind, like the globe of varying voltage and 
amps, and there is no possibility of consciousness states thereafter in the body. But 
what is this an evidence of? The absence of evidence to the contrary does not amount 
to evidence of absence.  
 
It seems that we need to free ourselves from the erstwhile polarity of  ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, i.e. of trying to locate consciousness within the mortal frame  (whether in 
the cinema of the ‘Cartesian theatre’, the supposedly non-physical mind), or, in some 
single spot within the body, such as the brain, much less in a single spot within the 
brain (the ‘Center of Narrative Gravity’). Our mental life, and if intentionality is 
anything to go by, is located neither outside in the world, nor inside our body. Perhaps 
in the new language that we are desperately in quest of we may have to speak of 
consciousness as that which is both constituted by and constitutive of  the body (not 
just the brain) and the mind (as the meaning-act and intention giving or tending 
instrument, antar-drstikarana). This sure does sound circular, but it is not viciously 
so; it is defeasible. Because, what we are trying to do is to avoid both the horns of the 
Cartesian-implied dilemma that we pointed to a moment ago: (i) the mind (alone) is 
responsible for consciousness; (ii) the natural world is itself generative of 
consciousness.  I am tempted to say, consciousness begins with (i), and matures with 
(ii), and yet – when we take in the historical dimension or long-term persistence of 
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consciousness as of time (which is how I would re-write Heidegger’s much clichéd 
‘Being and Time’) – consciousness curiously also constitutes (i) and (ii).   
 
IV Historicizing Consciousness 
To develop this point a bit further, by historical consciousness I mean the collective 
repository or archeology of  the inner-time consciousness across the board picking up 
on discrete human experiences . There is, as it were, a cumulative growth of 
consciousness states, layers upon layers, like fossils, now perhaps inert but once upon 
a time every bit was consciously felt and owned (or ‘pre-loved’) by some living 
agency. The agents may be‘ dead’ or mute but  the discrete train of traces or subtle 
effects, as it were, are brought forward as many artifacts, testimonies, records, 
achievements, merits and sins, values and aspirations – indeed, the outer-time 
consciousness or history in that more Hegelian sense – from generation to generation, 
epoch to epoch, and so on. How dare we leave consciousness out of the movement 
and trajectory of history, human and other sentient history (unless, we have moved 
through life like stars and galaxies governed by unself-conscious hidden laws of 
nature)?  For, the very sense of history is the collective self-consciousness and 
reflection upon the folding layers of qualias, such as are attached to whole groups’, 
races’, or communities ‘I’s (or ‘we’s), replicating in many ways the individual’s 
narratives and life-stories writ large (as when we speak of civilizations, the preserve 
of cultures, transcendental self-identity of enclosed communities, etc.).  
 
This back-logged consciousness also creates us in a manner of speaking; meaning that 
each individual (body-mind complex) inherits or imbibes fragments (in Hindustani 
there is a universalizing poetic image of ‘chand ka tukra’, ‘bits of the moon’) of the 
collectively conscious subjectivity or transcendental qualia (again, in a contingently 
historical property sense, rather than pre-assigned ontological sense). There is no 
gunatita, but rather it is itself property-propertied, kevalam gunatva-gunam; or 
substanceless property; hence the new discourse of  to ‘mentalese qualia only’. It is 
this that enables (or em-powers) many a capacity, and identifies us as distinct 
individuals belonging to distinct communities, not least of which are speech-language 
or lingua franca, discourse, self-story or social identity, moral values, religion, 
aspirations, and so on. And we pass these on, somewhat transformed, evolved or 
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regressed, often without self-conscious authorial imprimatur) to the next generation, 
ad infinitum. We should not loose sight of this unique dimension of transparency (as 
trans-parenting)  of consciousness, which I have called constitutive  - although some 
philosophers will still argue that it is merely correlative.14 
 
V. Branching Consciousness and Binding Awareness  
Nevertheless, like history, the next moment is never the same because it is 
‘interpreted’ or formed and fused through the antecedent moments. This was the 
genius also of the Buddhist theory of consciousness in its recognition of the branching 
effect, the mereological spread over finite time of a self-narrating, self-referring, 
stream of conscious-ing moments bound together (the ‘binding’ effect) in a loosely 
unified field, we like to call ‘self’ (not as an irreducible substance here), whose 
present self-awareness and knowledge of the world are supervenient upon properties 
and relations left-over from all the past experiences (conscious-ing states), and whose 
future is likewise determined by or is a mere trajectory of the vanishing present. 
Beneath all this noise so to speak, and beyond also, is nothing but emptiness – 
meaning, no-self, no-soul, no-mind, no-God, no-Brahman, no-Absolute, just 
nothingness.  (There are, of course, subtleties and differences within Buddhist 
schools, such as Yogacara and Sautrantika and Madhyamika, that we need not go into 
here).  
 
Western cognitive psychology and various consciousness theorists have preoccupied 
themselves far too much with the issue of the so-called ‘binding problem’, whereby 
disparate sensory impressions and inputs flooding in at different moments in the 
cognitive apparatus through which awareness might be coordinated seem to be 
experienced simultaneously.  However, the promising cover of the  binding solution 
has been somewhat blown, for this is the same sort of route followed earlier by 
theorists who proposed unity of apperception, regularity of associations within a 
bundle of perceptions or sensory impressions, and causal networks within branching 
streams of conscious life series each complete with its own distinct memory identities 
derived from experiences unique to that particular set, and so on. The simultaneity 
draw or pull seems to have been suggested by computational processes where various 
                                                            
14 Shields (op cit) mentions William Seager and Jaegwon Kim in a related contestation over 
correlative versus constitutive implications. 
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different inputs of data and equation, electric current and, say, telephonic sound 
additions, can suddenly produce a three-dimensional representation of a speaking 
robot (just one better than a conceivable human ‘zoombie’) who trots out results of 
complicated calculations than a consciously intelligent human subject may not be able 
to compete with that relative speed.  
 
So essentially, I have, argued for a historicized theory of consciousness that as it were 
‘cooks’ a quasi-substantial plenum or continuum of consciousness from 
sedimentations of contigent evolving (or devolving) human experiences in a collective 
march of instrumental and practical reason, and delivers at any specific point in 
historical time, the qualia of consciousness, complete with subjectivity (however 
fragmented or fractured and fractorous), and intentionality. We have the advantage in 
this account of retaining the ‘mental’ – or better, ‘mentalese’ – character of 
consciousness that are highlighted and basic to the two theories of consciousness 
considered so far, namely, Cartesian and Nyaya, but like the empiricists Locke and 
Hume, and the phenomenologists Husserl to J N Mohanty, we eschew from making 
any ontological commitments to the ‘true, real, essential substance-ness (dravyatva)’ 
of what is essentially a motley bag of qualias. John Locke15 referred to consciousness 
as a sense of self-knowledge, something acquired; it is verily our mental capacity to 
reflect upon ourselves. Hence, another way to describe consciousness is with 
reference to any property that can know itself. If one is still pressed for an argument 
for what we essentially are by some process of internal reflection or introspection, the 
best we have is the Humean version: ‘I looked inside myself and found no ‘I’, only a 
bundle of perceptions’, which echoes well the Buddha’s much earlier conclusion: 
‘‘Everything we are is the result of what we have thought’; perhaps even the eighteen-
century model: ‘I wittily joke, therefore I am (intelligence)’; or the Australian realist 
version: ‘I drink, therefore I am; if you don’t think I exist, mate, better buy your own 
beer [in] the next round… good on ye’ for the larger!’  
 
VI Reductionist and Eliminative Qualias 
Coming back to the point about  the historicality of consciousness and its cumulative 
effect on phenomenal experiences in every next moment,  this however in itself might 
                                                            
15 Flew, Antony, A Dictionary of Philosophy, Pan Books, London, 1984; first published in 1979, pages 
72 & 73. 
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not, as it clearly need not be, essential to consciousness, for if there were just one 
person (a purusa) in the whole universe who lived only temporarily without progeny 
(aprajapati) we would not  necessarily want to deny consciousness to the 
Mahapurusha. The difference nevertheless will be in the qualia of consciousness, the 
properties that is, which will be one of degree rather than of kind, just in the way your 
or my consciousness have refracted through many previous (time-sequenced) and 
different prisms (spatially) of conscious-ing moments.  Suffice it however to show 
that consciousness is something, it is profoundly enigmatic but a sure remainder in 
human experiences. This would suggest an irreducible core within consciousness or at 
least in the explanations and definitions of consciousness. Now this has been a moot 
issue and subject of much debate in recent works in philosophy and psychology on 
consciousness. But reductionism is alive and well in several quarters, some more 
ruthlessly eliminative than others. For example, Daniel Dennett does not believe that 
irreducibility in respect of the arresting mystery of subjectivity is such a big deal: that 
is to say, the reference to the subjective, to intentionality, can be carved off, and these 
too can be reduced to ordinary biological, physical features of the brain (qua Searle 
and the Churchlands), and exhaustively redefined in third-person (ordinary thing-
language) descriptions and criteria (e.g. our experience of heat is redefined in terms of 
kinetic energy that increases mean temperature). Such a redefinition eliminates any 
reference to the subjective appearances, the way heat or colour appears to 
individuals.16 
 
VII Non-reductionist Qualias 
There are some philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, Roger Penrose, and David 
Chalmers,17 who have resisted ironing out the perspectivism of persons into the 
smooth objectivity of the world of physics, much less in terms of unbending hard-
wired materialism. They urge that even if consciousness is not mystery, it is still 
unexpected from an objective approach to what it is like inwardly  to be in a conscious 
state and to have conscious (or unconscious) experiences which we may never be able 
to pass on, again, to the table or the computer that are in some ways the only 
                                                            
16 Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained.( Boston: Little, Brown, and Company), P. 
Churchland (1981) ‘Eliminative materialism and the prepositional attitude;. Journal of Philosophy 78 
(2): 67-90. 
17 Thomas Nagel (1986) The View from Nowhere  (New York: Oxford University Press); Roger 
Penrose (1994), Shadows of the Mind. ( Oxford: Oxford University Press); David J Chalmers (1996), 
The Conscious Mind In Search of a Fundamental Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press). 
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‘witnesses’ to these ruminations in the early hours of each morning (while the resident 
dogs seem to have a better sense of my angst). Given these characteristics, 
consciousness is at least ‘surprising’,  as Chalmers puts it.18 And so these 
philosophers believe that there is at least an epistemological irreducibility of mental 
processes to brain states that calls into question all attempts at one-sided elimination. 
Thus Nagel has argued, that ‘(t)he subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible 
feature of reality – without which we couldn’t do physics or anything else – and it 
must occupy as fundamental a place in any credible world view as matter, energy, 
space, time, and numbers’.19  Any ‘correct theory of the relation between mind and 
body would radically transform our overall conception of the world and would require 
a new understanding of the phenomenon now thought of as physical. Even though the 
manifestations of mind evident to us are local – they depend on our brains and similar 
organic structures – the general basis of this aspect of reality is not local, but must be 
presumed to inhere in the general constituents of the universe and the laws that govern 
them.’20   
 
Nagel’s epistemic non-reducibility (with a remainder)  reinforces the point I have 
been trying to press here  about the involvement of the larger picture, so to speak, of 
the world as a constitutive element in the emergence of consciousness, neither inside 
in the brain nor wholly outside in the heavens: but in the matrix that holds them 
together in an organic whole. Again, I agree with Nagel that the same entity  can have 
causally emergent physical and mental properties; this is called by Nagel, and others, 
the ‘dual-aspect theory’; I prefer to call it, non-dual naturalist emergentism, in which 
the necessity of an absolute ontological substratum to consciousness is eliminated. 
However, this position does not argue for a wholesale elimination of mental concepts 
in the explanation (for the ‘mentalese’ has a central role to play in terms of 
phenomenal properties that are supervenient upon physical occurrences, but they 
could also be dependent upon other inter-looping phenomenal properties or qualia ). 
Nor does the non-eliminative view of our mental world imply that we succumb to 
some version of ontological transcendentalism or the ‘mystical’ within subjectivity 
and intentionality! 
                                                            
18 Chalmers is drawing on some famous expressions made famous by Nagel, Lewis, and others. P. 5, 
and onwards. 
19 1986, pp. 7ff 
20 Ibid p. 8 
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VIII Process Theory’s Non-reductionist naturalism 
Such a position, which echoes recent developments in Process Para-Philosophy,21 
retains intact a common sense commitment to non-reductionist naturalism, while at 
the same time assuming a broad ‘radically empiricist’ notion of the data a theory 
ought to accommodate, including the capacity for nonsensory (‘extra-sensory’) 
perception, by virtue of admitting a role for the Nyaya’s notion of mensa extensa, the 
mind as having its own extension (in cohorts with res extensa within an organized 
division of labour). This overcomes the difficulties of accounting for the emergence 
of consciousness and its properties from purely extensional matter on the one hand, 
and pristinely extensional psyche on the other hand. The same topoi can have both 
these correlative qualias or aspects, if we allow qualias to be supervenient and the 
primary function in the equation of consciousness (C {hook both ways ][ }  [h]P(qsq)). 
The mentaelse qualia are in and of themselves constitutive or productive of 
consciousness. We may still be burdened, indeed haunted, by the same sort of 
problem that arises in attempting to make links from observing behaviour and 
properties of neurons and synaptic responses to stimuli inserted and observed from 
without to subjective states and intentionality experienced within; and vice versa. But 
there is a not implausible answer to this quandary from three possible quarters, which 
I shall now explore. 
 
 
IX.`Psychonalaysis and the cell of consciousness22 
Now Psychoanalysis associates ‘consciousness’ with the human psyche, yet when 
discussing the pleasure principle Freud refers to potential energy. This concept of 
energy relates to Freud’s computational model which creates an analogy between the 
human psyche and the workings of a computer. 
‘The energy of the network is viewed as potential energy that the 
system tends to minimize, the network is not isolated but is instead 
subject to energy shocks. The energy shocks depend on the response 
the network gives to externally imposed inputs, and the effect of any 
                                                            
21 As noted from Shields’ review of Griffin’s work cited earlier. 
22 I owe this part of the discussion to Jane Wiesner, from her unpublished paper she shared with me:  
‘In Search of Consciousness- Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. I have cited from her paper at length, 
without the intrusion of quote marks, with her permission..  
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shock is to add energy to the network. … The network learns through 
psychological Darwinism; those network arrangements are fittest that 
minimize the long-run energy shocks, and the fittest survive. 
..Freud’s view is that we are biological machines; we compute and 
learn by means of the pleasure principle, and we change our state 
according to physical law. Our nervous states include energy 
distributions that are representational and have a linguistic 
structure’23. 
 
This release of energy is something that affects us both on a mental and a physical 
level. But does this mean that a human cell has  ‘consciousness’? If so, is it something 
that can be altered by the state of our emotions? It is now becoming a growing belief  
in some western circles that the human body and mind are “one”. This bodymind 
connection is the subject of the book, The Molecules of Emotion24 by Candace Pert.  
Pert scientifically links human emotions to biochemistry suggesting that what we 
‘think’ manifests and is reflected in our physical state. To Pert, mind and body are 
very much of a one piece, functionally and epistemically. 
  
Like Freud’s computational analysis, Pert describes the human body as a biological 
network of systems that are interconnected. To Pert, our physical health is just a 
manifestation of the bodymind response to thought. She explains that every thought 
we have has an accompanying emotion which triggers the release of ligands 
(information molecules). Ligands bind to the cell’s receptors and pass information 
into the cell. These ligands can be in the form of antigens (toxins, viruses or bacteria), 
drugs, hormones, peptides, neuropeptides and/or neurotransmitters. Ligands are 
vehicles of communication between cells and organs in the body. Pert identifies 
neuropeptides25 and their receptors as molecules that are the substrates of emotions 
and she claims that these molecules are in constant communication with the immune 
system. Hence, what we think manifests in form and often sadly, in disease. 
                                                            
23 Neu, Jerome, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Freud, Press Syndicate of the University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, 1991; first published in 1991, page 63. 
24 Pert, Dr Candace, Molecules of Emotion – Why you feel the way you feel, Touchstone Publishers, 
New York, 1999. 
25 Neuropeptides are neuronal secretions; informational substances. Receptors receive information into 
the cell. Pert uses this analogy on page 25 of Molecules of Emotions:  a cell is an engine that drives 
life, receptors are buttons that push the control panel of the engine and the peptide (a kind of ligand) is 
the finger that pushes the button.   
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In the past, many have used the term ‘mind over matter’.  Pert’s discoveries 
suggest that we can no longer isolate the mental from the physical and that the mind 
can indeed rule over the body. In  Pert’s language, ‘consciousness’ does not just exist 
in a mental/spiritual realm, it also exists in the physical body on a molecular level. 
The bodymind connection is a continuum - our emotions affect the state of tension in 
the body and alternatively,  physical tension affects our emotions. 
 
Evidence of the human body’s innate information process is provided by its multitude 
of functions. For instance, the human bodymind can digest food, pump blood, produce 
hormones, conceive a child, all while composing a symphony and fighting an 
infection. Where do these instructions come from if not from the body’s own 
biological information processing system (or inherent language)? 
 
How does nature instruct a tree to grow if not by some inherent system of processing 
information? If consciousness is purely different forms of energy and all that exists is 
made up of a energy (refer to Einstein’s mass-energy relationship) then surely 
consciousness is an innate language present in all things; a language that operates on 
different levels depending on the sophistication of the information processing 
involved.  
 
All of this theorising leads us to further questions: Is a higher level of consciousness 
defined by intelligence (intelligence meaning aware, insightful and wise)? If this is so, 
then surely intelligence is not measurable by education and academic ability but 
simply by the individual’s capacity to discern; to be wise. In this sense, intelligence is 
related to a person’s ability to control the influences of the unconscious mind. It is 
represented by the individual’s degree of mental freedom from the controlling and 
programming influences of unconscious mind. Many philosophers agree that our 
environment can condition us to behave a certain way. It would seem that the only 
way we can fight this conditioning is through the use of our intellect. 
 
It was just such a quest to fathom the complexities of the mind, that led Freud to the 
discovery of the unconscious - the subterranean world of thoughts below the surface 
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of the conscious mind. To Freud26 there are three different states of mind, only one of 
which is a conscious state, these are; the unconscious, the conscious and the pre-
conscious27 (the pre-conscious is where information is stored eg what a person had for 
breakfast, but remains easily accessible and can be recalled when desired; these 
memories can be accessed at any time).  
 
Freud identified the unconscious as the mental realm responsible for our irrational or 
neurotic behaviour. He maintains that there is a difference between what we do with 
conscious awareness and what we are compelled to do by unconscious ‘prompters.’28 
Freud suggested that neuroses is caused by the repression of unfulfilled wishes 
(desires) usually associated with sexual wishes and the guilt attached to these wishes;  
we push certain thoughts below the surface of our conscious mind because our psyche 
is unable to deal with them. Interestingly, Freud claimed that even in a conscious state 
what is unconscious is still present. 
 
Psychoanalysis regards everything mental as primarily unconscious in the first place. 
The quality of consciousness may or may not be present. Therefore, the unconscious 
is a constant state which is visited by the conscious mind. Even in sleep our 
unconscious mind is activate. The goal of psychoanalysis is to allow the person to 
access the unconscious and deal with the issues repressed at a conscious level. 
 
X. Patanjali’s Yoga Consciousness 
Now on the Indian side, in The Yoga Sutras,29 Patanjali also claims that there are three 
levels of the mind. Citta is the name given to the totality of the mind. The three 
components are – buddhi, manas and ahamkara. Patanjali’s philosophy compels the 
adept to use his/her higher mind.  Buddhi (otherwise known in Samkhya as the Mahat 
or intellect) is used to discipline and control the sensate desires of the lower minds: 
cittivrtti norodha. Manas is the sensory realm of the mind; the desiring part. 
Ahamkara is the identity or ego.  
                                                            
26 Freud, Sigmund, 1. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Penguin Books, London, 1991; First 
published in Two Short Accounts of Psycho-Analysis, 1962. 
27 Neu, Jerome, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Freud, Press Syndicate of the University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, 1991; first published in 1991, page 5. 
28 “prompters” is a word used by American Philosopher U.S. Anderson for the things that prompt us to 
act they we are not aware of – Freud’s repression wishes manifesting into neurotic actions. 
29 Sri Swami Satchidananda, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Integral Yoga Publications, 1997. 
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These levels of mind are related to the two aspects of the self, which in Hinduism is 
referred to as atman and jiva.  The atman represents the higher self where the seer, the 
all-knowing source of awareness within the person, merges with Purusha (the eternal 
spirit). The jiva represents the part of the self that is limited by the sensory world. It is 
here that the mind is focused on the world of matter and subject to illusion. Frankly, 
as should be obvious from the preceding discussions, I am more interested in the jiva  
as the constituted and constituting locus of binding qualias – the stukAsthApaka or  
grand-stand of knitted qualias - then I am within the ambit of the principle of Atman, 
but which, as I said earlier, gets us far too much into the realm of the occult. The 
Jainas for this reason, I would proffer, preferred this more minimalist conception of 
the aware-ness making sense than that of Atman.  
 
Dreams and fantasies are paramount to Freud’s theories. He claimed that our 
repressed wishes manifest in symbolic form in our dreams. Through analysizing our 
dreams and our fantasies and through free association techniques we can become 
aware of what is repressed and learn to deal with it on a conscious level. Therefore, 
the process of psychoanalysis helps us to understand what lies beneath the surface of 
the mind. Freud explained the workings of the psyche through three agencies of the 
human personality; the id, the ego and the superego.  Freud refers to the id (the child 
ego) as the area of the psyche linked to primitive urges and desires. For instance, the 
id constitutes infant urges for gratification. When these urges are met the individual 
experiences what Freud terms the Pleasure Principle; a release of tension or cathexis 
of energy.  
Freud completes the picture of the psyche with two other ego states, which are in my 
view ways of representing the different bindingly bounded bundles of distinctive 
qualias, of various levels of complexity (they are related to each other through  
principles of inherence, transparency and transference – images relfecting across three 
darkened mirrors facing each other at an angle). The first of this is the Superego 
(parent ego). It develops from a person’s internalization of the moral demands made 
by society. This phase takes place during the resolution of the Oedipus complex when 
the individual identifies with parental dictates. The Superego is where the individual’s 
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feelings of guilt arise. This development is often demonstrated when we see a small 
child playing house and acting out a parental reprimand with friends or play things.   
 
The Ego (adult ego) develops from the infant state. Through the inevitable frustration 
of dealing with external realities the infant learns to adapt itself to the exigencies of 
reality, this is what Freud calls the Reality Principle. In other words, this state 
develops as the child tries to make sense of the world around him/her. He/she learns 
to negotiate with others and realises that other people can be manipulated. Where the 
pleasure principle dominates the id, the reality principle dominates the ego.  
 
Both Freud and Patanjali, it would seem, associate pain with ignorance. Freud’s pain 
is represented by the internal conflict we experience when our desires are not met 
(basic drives); the uncompromising and demanding id. Ignorance is founded on our 
inability to conquer these unconscious drives. Patanjali’s concept of pain is also 
derived from ignorance; a state of unawareness. Freud’s theory also suggests that we 
can be conscious and unconscious (the principle of unawareness) at the same time. In 
other words, we may be conscious of the world around us but still remain oblivious to 
the influences of our unconscious mind; how it provokes certain behaviour. For 
instance, a clinical analysis might declare a person fully conscious – alert and aware 
of who he/she is – yet all the while that person’s unconscious mind may be 
manufacturing responses to repressed memories that he/she is totally unconscious of. 
One example of this is someone who continually overeats to the point of obesity. This 
person may do so as a form of self-punishment or because of an oral fixation30 yet still 
remain oblivious to why he/she is doing it. Patanjali also teaches that we are 
conscious yet unconscious. A duality expressed by our tendency to bury our 
consciousness underneath an attachment to the sensory/material world; a veil of 
illusion.  
 
The influence of eastern philosophy on Freud’s views, which came via 
Schopenhauer’s extensive dabbling into Buddhist and Vedanta thought, is reflected in 
                                                            
30 Oral Fixation: Freud identified the oral stage of development as the first postnatal year when the 
libido is initially focused on the mouth and its activities e.g. nursing enables the infant to be gratified 
through a pleasurable reduction in tension in the oral region. 
Encyclopedia Britannica Multimedia Edition, article - Sigmund Freud, The Development of Human 
Behaviour: Theories of development: Psychoanalytic theories CD 98. 
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other areas of his studies. For example, he claimed the existence of an innate and 
regressive drive for stasis within the human psyche; a drive that aims to end life’s 
inevitable tension. 
‘This striving for rest Freud christened the Nirvana Principle and 
the drive underlying it the death instinct, or Thanatos, which he 
could substitute for self-preservation as the contrary of the life 
instinct, or Eros.’31 
 
XI. RAMANUJA, the Mimamsaka Borrowings 
Now I come, finally, to Ramanuja. I am not as much interested in Ramanuja’s metaphysical 
excesses, much less his theistic qualifications to Sankaran advaita (nondualism) as I am in 
his more muted and mundane concept of consciousness for which he relies on a realist 
epistemology. The individual and the Absolute (Brahman) are related in Ramanuja’s 
metaphysics in a sort of identity-in-difference relation. I leave the ‘identity’ side to the more 
moksa-mired Sankars of the Brahmanic orders, while I move to the more subaltern 
(subultahua) concerns of the side of the ‘difference’ qua différance. For Ramanuja, clearly, 
consciousness is a part of the whole i.e., Brahman; however, there is the human side of 
consciousness as experienced in everyday life and this appears to have marked by an 
entirely different and real set of qualities. Its first mark is that consciousness is inherently 
and non-negotiably intentional; hence the facticity of intentionality of consciousness ought 
to belong to this locus.  Sarirasariribhava, dharmabhutajnana, dharmibhutajnana and 
bhedabheda are technical wordings he often uses in his analogy.  For Sankara 
consciousness is the essence of atman.  Ramanuja however differentiates atman and 
Brahman, at one significant level – that of human embodiment (avataras and Sabhi Babas 
notwithstanding); for Ramanuja consciousness is only the essence of Brahman, and in the 
atman  it is an attribute, a property, a quality. This is instructive and important for my 
evolving theory of consciousness, as the descriptive metaphysic that follows from the kind 
of analysis Ramanuja provides for the attribute he calls consciousness (in embodied 
experience) is just what my theory needs, albeit, minus the further assumption of the atman  
as its necessary locus (jiva could do the same job with little to no metaphysical assumptions 
and Vedantic hybris, for Mimamsakas, to whom Ramanuja indeed owes much for this 
elegant thesis). 
                                                            
31 Sigmund Freud, The Development of Human Behaviour: Theories of development: Psychoanalytic 
theories. Encyclopedia Britannica Multimedia Edition, article, CD 98. 
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Now here the distinction that Ramanuja makes between ‘primary definition’, 
svarupalaksana, and tatasthalaksana, ‘secondary definition’, is apposite. While the 
svarupalaksana encompasses all the wonderful attributes of Brahman spoken of in the 
Upanisads and the Brahmasutras: Sat-Cit-Ananda; under the tatasthalaksana he includes a 
lot more than Sankara is moved to: srsti, sthiti, and laya, jnana, and consciousness.  In 
Ramanuja’s understanding primary and secondary attributes are not devided equally or 
identically between Brahman and atman.  So, jnana is not primary svarupa of atman, but it 
is tatastha.  Or conversely, cit (as distinct from Cit) is not primary to Brahman, but it so 
only for jivatman.  If follows that for Ramanuja, consciousness can be tatastha – accidental, 
contingent and not Absolute, but sufficient for our empirical jiva to function.  Hence, the 
analysis of conscious in Ramanuja differs on this count from analysis of consciousness in 
Sankara – especially, concerning the phenomenology of everyday consciousness, such as, 
perception - outer state and inner states of the mental.   
 
In his commentary on the Vedantasutras, ‘Sribhasya’, Ramanuja considers consciousness 
to be an ‘illumining’, a ‘making present’ here and now function, i.e. presenting of an object 
to a subject, by consciousness’s own existence and not through the agency of something 
else.32  As Julius Lipner explains: 
 
For Ramanuja, the relation between the atman and consciousness in 
its various ramifications may best be examined by a form of 
introspective self-awareness in which the knower catches itself at 
work, so to speak.  For it is only in and through consciousness that the 
atman can be present to itself, understand its essence and look into the 
grounds of its being.33   
 
Why would Ramanuja say that consciousness is an ‘illumination’ by its own and not 
through another agency?  Ramanuja’s central point is that consciousness is sui 
generis, but this does not necessarily commit him to a svarupalaksana position; rather 
only at the level of secondary definition of atman, as experience of self. The terms 
‘anubhuti’, and ‘atma’ i.e., consciousness and the self are not synonymous.  Unlike 
                                                            
32 Lipner, Julius, The Face of Truth, Albany: SUNY Press, 1986, p.50. 
33 Lipner, ibid, p.49. 
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Ramanuja, Advaitins consider anubhuti is atma. There is nothing to say that anubhuti 
cannot be svayamprakasa (self-illumined); another knowledge is not necessary to 
manifest anubhuti, i.e. the experience of being conscious (even in its intentionality 
pose).   Consciousness does not need another consciousness to know consciousness; it 
can be its own intentional object. 
 
Ramanuja accepts that consciousness is svayamprakasa; but for him there are two 
types of consciousness. The two types of consciousness are: dharmibhuta-jnana and 
dharmabhuta-jnana, the substantive and attributive consciousness respectively. 
Dharmibhuta consciousness is adhara, the foundational consciousness that makes the 
self aware of itself. Dharmabhutajnana is the attributive consciousness that qualifies 
each jivatma. ‘In fact, the stuff of the flame (tejas) may be spoken of as functioning 
both as substance and as quality’.34 Further, ‘Jivatmas’ are several; they are conscious, 
they each have their own knowledge base and items of knowledge – ‘dharmabhuta 
jnana’.  The objection rises, if so, what is the expression of ‘my knowledge is lost’ 
and ‘I have got new knowledge’35; what do they mean?  Hence knowledge can be lost 
and gained also. Ramanuja says that dharmabhutajnana in an individual’s samsaric 
life has the capacity to contract (nastam) and expand (utpannam).  
 
In Advaita, if anubhuti becomes object of another knowledge then it is not anubhuti at all.  
In contrast to this, for Ramanuja – ‘vartamanadasayam’ occurs at the moment in time when 
the visaya is understood, the nature of anubhuti is to shine forth in its locus.36  When the 
object is cognized, the knowledge itself by its own light illuminates the locus of its 
experience – the object out there.  
 
 
XII. Ramanuja on other states of consciousness : ‘andhahkarana’  
 
The Upanisads recognized susupti, deep sleep, as a profound state of an individual, in its 
more unconscious modality. Ramanuja’s treatment of susupti clarifies distinctive features 
of his position on the conscious self.  Both Ramanuja and Sankara agree that although in 
                                                            
34 Lipner, ibid, p.51. 
35 ‘mama jnana nastham’ and  ‘jnananam utpannam’ 
36 ‘visayaprakasana velayam svasttayaiva svasrayam prati prakasamanatva anubhuti, 
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susupti there is an inactivity of the senses, consciousness nevertheless persists. Their 
disagreement is about the manner in which consciousness is interred and manifests itself.  
 
Ramanuja does not agree the Advaitic view that one’s ‘I’ awareness is the product of 
ego that ceases to exist, and only the undifferentiated underlying consciousness exists; 
such an underlying consciousness can be identified with absolute atman or the 
supreme self. And the Advaitin’s claim is that this Advaitic view can be proved using 
the phenomenon of deep sleep where there exists no awareness of one’s own ‘I’.  In 
other words, individual consciousness ‘in and through one’s I-awareness is an 
illusion, a superimposition on absolute consciousness, to be sublated in liberation 
permanently as it is in susupti temporarily’.37  Ramanuja cannot accept the Advaitic 
view of susupti where the non-dualist conclusion is drawn from that judgment, but he 
agrees with his opponent on the post-susupti form of experiences ‘I slept well’, ‘I was 
conscious of nothing, not even myself’, and on this count rejects the essential non-
duality of consciousness at this level as well.  Ramanuja even warns not to valorize 
susupti on its face-value, if face value is taken, not only self-awareness is denied, but 
even so-called ‘pure consciousness’ itself is, for one can say comfortably after waking 
up that he  ‘was conscious of nothing’.  The intentional character of this anubhuti is 
retained intact.  Ramanuja’s affirmation is that when the susupti experience is 
analyzed, it shows that during susupti consciousness does persist in the form of ‘self-
awareness’ and ‘susupti’ foreshadows (prefigures) a form of salvific bliss 
(dowunderanada).  Ramanuja’s main argument is that the first person ‘I’ that cannot 
escape or ceases to exist in susupti, in the same way this is the case in pre-susupti and 
post-susupti experiences of the same person: ‘I did this’, ‘This was experienced by 
me’ etc. This judgment is not possible unless the same ‘I’ is a continuing base or 
apperception.  Consciousness continues or ambles along in its merry-jolly form 
throughout sleep, as evident in the form of a flickering reflection ‘I had a wonderful 
dream: I was the made the Chief Minister of Lanka’.   
 
Lipner rightly remarks, ‘it appears that for Ramanuja dreamless sleep is a state of pure 
reflexive awareness, in which the atman is aware only of itself as ‘I’,’38 but the I-reality is 
not clear and distinct due to the predominance of the tamasic quality that veils it. But it 
                                                            
37 Lipner, ibid, p58 
38 Lipner, ibid, p.59. 
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does not mean that Ramanuja agrees that there is no ‘I’ in the duration of sleep; in fact, 
‘there is no loss even in susupti of I-awareness right up to wakefulness, on account of the 
atman flickering in its sole form as the ‘I’’.39  I prefer to call this latter ‘I’ that is wakefully 
(to itself but not to the empirical ego) present in sleep and dreamlessly present in deep sleep 
(but not to the dream sub-ego), and all but veiled over by other kinds of tamas in the 
unconsciousness, or under the drowsiness of an anesthetic shot, or after excessive 
consumption of rasmalai sufficient to render it zoombie-like, (a common site outside K C 
Das’s), verily the ‘andhah-karana)’. It is curious that this counterfactual to the antahkarana  
was never thought of in the tradition, that would cockle the hearts of both Freud and the 
Maithiliguru Gaudapada.  But I think I have found it, or rather traces of it in its linga form 
yet to be fully exploded in its conceptual fullness, in the side of Ramanuja’s ego 
psychology which he owes to the Mimamsa influence, deadly against the Middle-period 
Nyaya and Vedanta occultism. 
 
Hence, it follows that the individual self (jiva) in its daily sojourn undergoes three states of 
consciousness: waking, dreaming, and deep sleep.  Jiva, the individual self, is awake in 
order to apprehend the sense objects, associated with a physical body, with sense organs 
and mind (manas) with the mental modifications (vrttis) without which there would be no 
connection with sense objects40.  In dream state, the mind features as an adjunct, a qualia-
sthana of (jiva) and the jiva through the mind rendered unconscious, experiences the 
impressions fixed on the mind from its waking state.41  Deep sleep is a state without a trace 
of any particular cognition as to what is happening to the jivatman, save for the empirical 
‘I’ that continues to manifest to itself as ‘I’ even during sleep.42  For the Visistadvaitins it is 
not necessary to assume that there is a pure consciousness behind the veil of self ignorance 
that one experiences in deep sleep. Ramanuja follows Yamuna’s coinage of the term 
yogyanupalabdhi, the ‘competent non-cognition’ to prove the non-existence of so-called 
Advaitins pure consciousness.  According to Yamuna, if pure-consciousness were to be 
present in sleep, it would have been remembered as such after waking or in waking state 
awareness.  The fact is contradictory; therefore pure-consciousness is not present in the 
                                                            
39 Lipner, ibid, p.161. 
40 Michael Comans, ‘The Self in Deep Sleep According to Advaita and Visistadvaita’, Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, 1990, vol 18, pp. 1-28, p.2. 
41 Ibid. Although Comans is taking these descriptions for Sankara’s Brahmasutrabhasya, the analysis 
so far is common to both Advaita and Visistadvaita. 
42 Comans, Ibid, p. 7. 
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deeper states of sleep.43  Ramanuja develops this argument, as there is no recollection of 
pure consciousness after sleep or swoon, there is no such thing as pure consciousness.  
Rather it is the empirical ‘I’ that persists since it is still not, indeed never in any of these 
states, negated.  
 
However, the objection from the rival (Advaitin) camp is that the empirical ‘I’ is negated 
and indeed pure consciousness persists in post-susupti state, as the sleeper upon waking is 
prone to reflect: ‘I did not know anything during sleep’.  Ramanuja is aware of the Advaitic 
retort that in the post-susupti state one is prone to say ‘I did not know anything’ may still 
require the connecting apparatus of the empirical ‘I’ or ahamkara that connects the object 
that was absent there in sleep.  And yet some evidence seems to suggest that this empirical 
ego is absent in the non-waking states we are concerned with. As Coman 
s puts it, ‘Visistadvaita is hard pressed to maintain that empirical ‘I’ is not negated during 
sleep.   On the contrary, the evidence is that the empirical “I” is negated during sleep. Yet 
there still remains a continuity of being between the waker and the sleeper for upon waking 
there is no sense of non-being, but rather there is a sense of continuity of being, for the 
waker does not think that he is essentially different from the one who was asleep.’44 But, 
Yamuna would say that the absence of one thing and loss of something else (empirical ‘I’ in 
this instance) need not require for its recollection a third thing, tertium quid, the re-emerged 
pure self (‘Comans suddenly shifts to calling it, with upper case, C, ‘Consciousness’) that 
Advaita seems to want to resuscitate in the Brahmasutra account.45 The Visistadvaitins are 
not interested in proliferating the base from which such recollections are being made. The 
continuity is accounted for in terms of the empirical ‘I’ having been submerged, rather than 
negated altogether. It is the same empirical ‘I’ that is present to itself and to the objects of 
its senses in waking (aham-pratyaya in pratyaksajnana, dharmibhutajnana); absent to itself 
in sleep but present to impressions of the senses from previous moments and recollections 
(qua dharmabhutajnana); absent to itself and to all impressions in deep sleep, but for 
certain traces (samkarasa) that continue not in the ‘eye of the ‘I’’ but in the vortex of 
                                                            
43 Comans, Ibid, p.7. 
44 Comans, Ibid, p23 
45Comans seems to confuse absence or negation, as he terms it, of the empirical ‘I’ in sleep as 
evidence of the persistence of self, presumably as pure consciousness. But this is a long shot; a 
rationalist like Parfit will want to negate all sense of ‘I’, empirical ‘I’ included,  in sleep precisely 
because he wants to claim that there is no real continuity of an abiding self-identity other than memory 
recollections and branching awareness processes. So fighting against the Visistadvaitins is not going to 
make gainful scores for Sankara or the Advaita position as Comans thinks he is doing, rather he should 
have seen this as a victory for Ramanuja and Yamuna.   
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peripheral (laghuvibhu) awareness to which the ‘I’ suddenly wakes up and claims 
proprietorship or disowns the imagery painted therein (as the examples have illustrated).  
 In postmodern language this insight is captured in less prosaic terms, by Joseph 
Margolis discussing dreams in Freudian thought, and I quote: ‘dreams, then, taken in the 
usual Freudian sense, signify  an absent that is present because it is decipherably absent, 
determinately absent, however difficult and approximate our science. In the jargon, dreams 
signify an alterity that is hidden, obscured, displaced, deformed, censored: it leaves a trace 
in what is manifest but can be recovered because it is present (as absent).’46 The absence of 
self ‘must be operative within the sign for it to operate as such’47. That sign in Ramanuja’s 
psychology is the ‘I’, albeit the empirical (vyavaharika, laukika, subaltern, sadharana, 
maamuli, paratah as alterity [that is, recognized by and in the other person]), self.  
 
 
XIII. Atman Eliminated and Consciousness liberated in Qualia Kaivalya 
All this goes to show that our awareness can be divided into two types – the waking state 
and non-waking state.  Within the non-waking state, sometimes though we are not aware of 
the outer world, we go into the inner world i.e., we dream.  But rest of the non-waking state 
is the deep sleep where we get into the deeper level of sleep, during that time we know 
nothing and this is our everyday experience.  The fact that a person recovers his 
consciousness after deep sleep means that it was present even in sleep, though he was not 
conscious of it.  In deep sleep the self perceives nothing and is of the nature of inactive 
consciousness. But it is arguable what kind and level of consciousness we are talking about 
here.  At the time of deep sleep, the speech, eye, ear, mind are restrained.  Sankara 
identifies the world ‘akasa’ with the supreme self48 and says when the organs are restrained; 
the self rests in its own self.  ‘(I)t is the general Vedanta doctrine that at the time of deep 
sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman 
the whole world proceeds, inclusive of prana, and so on’.49  If, deep sleep allows jiva to 
become unified with supreme Brahman, the locus of the jiva, then why should not every 
one gets liberated in sleep? 
                                                            
46 ‘Deconstruction; or, the mystery of the mystery of the text’, Estratto, dalla Rivista di 
Estetica n. 14/15 – 1983 – Anno XXIII (Torino), pp 73-88, p. 77. 
 
47 Margolis is citing Gayatri Spivak from her Preface to Grammatology. I have ironed out 
the primal mantra somewhat  to yield a ‘vac’ effect in the Visistadvaita ontology.  
48 Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisad, Br. Up. II.1.17, p. 189, akasa – sabdena para evasva 
atmocyate; prana – breath Sankara considers it as nose: prana iti grahanendriyam. 
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Through his emphasis on tatasthalaksana, secondary attributive description, and 
analysis of the various stages of consciousnss Ramanuja has brought the theory of 
consciousness in the different states of mind that we pass through – and he limits 
himself to the traditional three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, Ramanuja has 
underscored the contigency of consciousness and its supervenience on qualities that 
we have called qualias. This fits well the kind of position I have been developing, 
without the prolixity and encumbrances of the metaphysical assumptions of pure 
consciousness or non-corporeal substance or dravya that ontological dualist theories 
are wont to hang their theories on. Non-dualism, qualified in the direction of the 
ordinary language of consciousness and common sense, in Ramanuja’s descriptive 
metaphysics (without fraying into his soteriological agenda and theistic 
preoccupations) serve the purpose far better than the Advaitin position. And here the 
reformed Mimamsaka is redeemed. 
 
Conclusion 
To bring this discussion to a close, let me highlight again some salient issues and 
characteristics of consciousness that have been uncovered in order that the discussion 
moves forward rather than backward in the multi-disciplinary inquiry that we are all 
engaged in. Here are 10 significant points (with two supplements) I have argued for in 
this short analysis: 
 
1. Consciousness is the name for the preeminent principle of awareness in every 
day experience that is responsible for making an occurrent self-consciously (or 
self-awareingly) an experience: it is what illuminates an experience  – we may 
call this the conscious mind; 
2. consciousness has content but no particular form; it takes the form or contours 
of the occurrent experiences which the awareness shadows or witnesses, albeit 
not as an entity distinct from sensations, feelings, cognitions and other mental 
states as mapped in phenomenological analysis; 
3. awareness may be submerged or suspended as in unself-conscious processes, 
dreams and deep sleep states – or the unconscious;  
                                                                                                                                                                          
49 Thibaut, The Vedantasutras: with the commentary by Sankaracarya, Part I, 1.4.18, p.273. 
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4. there is (either way) an irreducible core of subjectivity and intentionality that 
makes the conscious mind more than all sensations, bodily ascriptions, 
experiences, including the “I-sense” and moral knowledge; 
5. it is thus more than the physiological-neural and synaptic-receptor, etc. 
activities inside the brain or sense-organs (manas included); 
6. the processes and brain mechanisms observed or chartered from outside (or 
yogically, i.e. mystical-meditative introspection) yield at best correlates and 
not what is constitutive of consciousness in all its complexity; 
7. basically, consciousness is constituted by and constitutive of the world 
(recurrently birthing) within a historical and social-cultural process; this is the 
horizon of the transcendental subjectivity into which the individuated 
subjectivity is fused; in other words, 
8. the ‘Narrative Gravity’ extends beyond the individual ‘owner’ to the larger 
cumulative historical dimension that constitutes the world and interactively the 
qualias of all consciousness (i.e. differentially spaced  branching streams of 
conscious-ings each of which creates its own contingent ‘I-feeling’ ); 
9. it follows from 4 and 8 above that consciousness is not a substance 
(materialistic or spiritual and non-corporeal) but a phenomenal property qualia 
(or intertwined clusters of qualias) and there is no such thing as ‘pure’ or 
‘absolute consciousness’ in the metaphysical sense (it could be transcendental 
in the phenomenological sense, as in the ‘inner core structuring noema’); 
10.  we need principles of phenomenological supervenience in lieu of  
unidirectional causal language (thus, e.g. mental event M is supervenient on 
physical event P which is observed from outside as P*, ceteris paribus), 
mereological apperception (identity is generated from within the branching 
and binding series), and a more inclusive ontology of non-dual naturalism 
(aspectual or property dualism within ‘natural’ philosophy) to re-define and 
refine our understanding of consciousness 
11. this would help eradicate outmoded discourses of mind-body dualism and 
epiphenomenalism (Cartesian and Indian), false identifications (upadi, 
adhyasa) of consciousness with Self, Soul, Spirit, God, Brahman, Absolute, 
Nirvana- or Svarga-bhokta (each of whose existence remains in doubt); 
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12.  By such a test, we will have put the Grand Narrative of the Mind to rest, and 
given the life of the mind a chance.  
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Summary of Indian Theories of the Mind 
 
From the Indian side, I would like to throw in three rather perfunctory theories of the 
mind, albeit in the context of a discourse about a larger ontology the mind is 
inextricably an element of, essentially, accidentally, or elemently. These are: 
Samkhya-Yoga, Vedanta (Ramanuja), contemporary Nyaya.  
My claim will be that whatever other deep metaphysical or spiritual undergrowth 
might inform or be thought to be foundational to one or other of the Brahmanical 
schools within Indian thought (from Ayurveda, medical texts to later-day logicists), 
we can still find well-developed theories, or perhaps traces echoing comparable 
theories in the Hellenic tradition, on the materiality of the mind, in so far as anything 
like a ‘mind’ is accepted by these schools, and there seems always to be an untidy 
remainder between the high-flights of a spiritualises metaphysics (e.g, atman, 
Brahman, purusha) and fully-fledged naturalism (embodiment, real qualia), that 
answers to questions such as: ‘What is on your mind?’, ‘Did the affliction of the mind 
affect the body, and vice versa?’ ‘Can your mind control these strong emotions?’ ‘Is 
your mind too attached to the objects of sensations?’ ‘Has your mind lost all powers 
of moral discrimination?’ etc. Such a discourse would be empty if there wasn’t some 
kind of understanding or presupposition about mental states with certain distinctions; 
the question is, ‘Exactly what?’  The material is rich, as it is ambivalent and daunting 
for a historian of philosophy at least. Let us look at some quick samples. We being 
with human awareness and what this might involve. 
  
Samkhya-Yoga claims that there are three levels of mental processing in an individual 
each corresponding to a distinct awareness-state: manas, ahamkara, buddhi. These 
could even be regarded as distinct mental faculties, unified in a superintending faculty 
(mahant). Manas is the called the ‘mind-organ’, that assimilates and synthesises sense 
impressions acting as a purveyor of information and it brings about awareness of the 
objects reached out by the senses (sensory-organ contact, as a causal condition, is 
neither always necessary nor sufficient for this ‘awareness’ to arise). It is also a 
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unifier of the inputs from the various sensory-organ, being itself a super-organ (of the 
size, sometimes said metaphorically (?), of the liver or the kidney, etc.) Functionally,  
it has some resemblance to Aristlotle’s ‘communis sensus’. What do we make of this 
mind? 
 
Ahamkara is the principle of individuation, self-identification or ego-sense, which 
functions like Kant’s unity of apperception of experiences. This is the embodied, 
related-to-other or self in recognition of its own alterity; this is not the sense of the ‘I 
am Atman, or the great Self’, that arises that are said to arise at advanced levels of 
yogic or nirvanic attainments. It is perhaps ‘nirvana lite’ or even at its deepest level, 
atma-lite’ known as sakshin or ‘witness-awareness’. The latter is an important 
conception for contemplative self-awareness, etc, which is tantamount to a theory of 
‘two minds’. Now that itself is a remarkable suggestion. I doubt there is anything 
comparable in Descartes (though a simulacrum in his predecessors, Ignatius of Loyola 
and Eckhart).  An elegant phenomenological study on this analysis, first begun by 
Mohanty and Saxena, was published recently. 
 
The third level, Buddhi is the finest and most subtle aspect of human awareness, often 
equated with the conscience, the faculty of judgment or decision that determines a 
reasoned response-tracking, and deeper understanding of abstractions, universals, 
moral laws, and other enigmas that Heidegger would say lay concealed in the ‘House 
of Being’ or the templum, etc. 
 
Larson claims this particular analysis is to be read as an eliminative-style move in 
Samkhya at least, meaning that there is no necessity to assume any kind of substantial 
base to the mind, and that one can stay comfortably with a qualitative (guna) 
constellation; i.e. as mentalese qualia. Larson is able to say this because a cautionary 
claim rests in the dualist system according to which the singular purusha, essential 
spirit, of which there are trillions, does not stir or do anything or is even self-aware 
until it comes in contact with Prakrit,  nature (think of Timaeus’s hyle). Materiality – 
like creation, gods and time elsewhere – are after-effects of this originary ‘2-to-tango’ 
or ‘Big Bang’ event.  Mind is one of the middling evolutes, after intelligence 
sediments in the large lava-like mahat. (de Chadin found reinforcement in such a 
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theory which he found echoed in Ramanuja’s ontology). Mind is important 
nevertheless, as the ‘window to the external and internal world’. However – and this 
is where the challenge for theorists lie – the mind is held responsible for all the 
wrongs, and the derailment that has gone on, and considered to be the chief obstacle 
to a stoic, ascetic, life of askesis and compassion and self-realization, etc. What is so 
terribly wrong with the mind: why is it not being worshipped as the citadel of reason 
here? .) How there be morality without the latter? Is the mind shockingly full of 
emotions, lust and desires? ‘These two, experience and emancipation, are created by 
the mind (ie.. buddhi) and function only in the mind (citta)…In the mind alone are 
bondage, which is the failure to fulfil the purpose of purusha,  emancipation, which is 
completion of that purpose.’ (Yyasa commentary on YS 11.18). 
 
Mind is the condition or the possibility of experience, but why it mind also become a 
seat of evil and deceit, and self-deceit indeed; and the telos,  true intentionality, 
located elsewhere? Like Descartes’s own demon! Now who cannot see cross-cultural 
convergences here? At least on the ‘negatives’? (You can hear another Yogi on this: 
‘Everyone in the world reco’nises Evil when they see it; no one wants it; and our 
friends in the East will be freed of the mind shortly.) 
 
The Yoga tradition itself develops a rather more refined and sanguine (I think I mean, 
reasonable and reliable, as in testimonial witness), conception of the mind, for which 
it provides a better term, citta, ‘base consciousness’. All experiences are 
modifications, rather than evil-turning, of this consciousness. A lot more is packed 
into citta  than we had in the earlier manas; hence, memory, recollection from deeper 
recesses, past lives, the unconscious and even to a degree the collective unconscious 
(cultural and social universals, jatis), are built into the theory (possibly from insights 
developed in the alternative shramanic or yogic-psychology schools, notably Jain and 
Buddhist). 
  
There seems to be more of all this in later systems (late Upanishads, e.g. Pangaala, 
Mahanarayanana), and various others right through to the Bhagavadgita that takes up 
the Samkhya-Yoga challenge as it ‘buys out’ the mind altogether (almost, except that 
it retains the Vedanta proclivity for intellectual curiosity as well). The symbol of the 
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chariot is replayed: the senses are like horses; the mind with the ego the reins, and the 
buddhi the charioteer. Pick your choice. 
 
Does it make for a functionalist or a structuralist account of mental processes?  
 
There is no agreement among contemporary Indian philosophers on this matter, but it 
presents a point of interaction with ancient Western quandaries also.  
 
 
(iv) Vedanta, associated with the names of Sankara (8th century CE) and Ramanuja 
(11th century CE) and known for its metaphysical excesses, which the Buddhist have 
spent time ravaging. However, there is a side to Ramanuja’s analysis of embodied 
consciousness which is closer to modern phenomenology than it is to, say, Sankara’s 
metaphysical absolutism. In what could be described as Ramanuja’s phenomenology 
of everyday consciousness, mental states are reductively intentional, accidental, 
contingent and not absolute in any sense of the term. Consciousness’s function is one 
of ‘illumining’ or ‘making present’ objects to the subject as the agent-cogniser. He 
adds that consciousness has its own property of self-illuming (svayamprakasha); it 
does not stand in need of another property or substance for this sui generis function. 
Curiously, Ramanuja’s analysis of mental states draws its illustration and test-cases 
from all three states: waking, dream, and deep-sleep. Is there any value to resorting to 
non-conscious or unconscious states for such an analysis? Perhaps there is, even if 
only of heuristic value.  Vedanta begins with ‘one-mind’ but ends up with 
individualised minds, each haunted by its own distinctive set of experiences, 
existential angsts, emotion turmoils, memories, private language-games (‘dog-house of 
being’, rather than ‘God-House of Being’), and destiny that could trek off in any 
number of directions….   But this is unlike all other ‘one-mind’ cosmic visions one 
reads elsewhere. 
 
Finally, the neo-Nyaya and its contemporary incarnation. Here I simply focus on 
Kisor Chakrabarti’s work. Chakrabarti wants to suggest that there is a kind of deep 
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dualist motivation at work in the structure of  the Nyaya conception of the mind, 
beginning with its padartha ontology and ending with painstaking analysis  in 
subsequent Nyaya thinking on the workings of the mind, structure of cognition, and 
the pre-linguistic, that apparently address and resolve the erstwhile  ‘mind-body’ and 
knowledge conundrums. 
 
 Indeed, Chakrabarti seems to want to applaud  this episteme of mental state dualism 
in the way in which Cartesian dualists and perhaps rigid epiphenomenologists at one 
time celebrated  dualist tendencies in Western philosophy of mind. To be sure, 
Chakrabarti is not an unmitigated Cartesian dualist;  he admits there are problems 
with the more ‘simple-minded’ conception with its tripartite division that Descartes 
had promulgated, but some redress emerge from the classical Nyaya monadology. 
Such haunting questions as, how can two apparently distinctive categories (substances 
or properties), mind and body, thought and object,  cognition and thing, be said to 
interact or connect, appear to have new light shed on them here. 
 Chakrabarti is wrong. I wish to show that this approach to ‘classical’ Indian 
philosophy of mind is dated; this route has been tried before, by Western scholars 
writing on Indian philosophy and their native apologists. Nyaya philosophy of mind 
has not dealt adequately with the question of intentionality and emotions: ‘love 
devotion and surrender’; and the neo-Nyaya rejoinder to Buddhist challenges is no 
better for this.  Dualism (or dualistic mentalism) remains more a rhetorical troupe 
from which to launch a whole series of reflections in the contemporary philosophy of 
mind; the West has settled for some kind of monism (or non-dual mentalese by 
another name). In short, the mind-body dualism problem as we have historically (and 
culturally perhaps) become accustomed to in Western thought does not translate itself 
easily into other intellectual traditions; and it is a false move to think that they do, the 
persuasive solutions notwithstanding.  Why Chakrabarti did not read psycho-onto 
trinitism or pluralism  (deha-manas-atma),  in Nyaya is also rather puzzling.  
 On a closer reading of Nyaya texts, this strategy appears to me to founder on 
two other ground. The Nyaya atma  in its original zombie-like state does not have 
seamless or even serial consciousness as its essential characteristic, and so it cannot 
be compared to Descartes' mind (nor to the Cartesian soul. There is a something, 
however, like this ‘soul’ in early Ayurveda theory, en route to a theory of the 
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separable mind). Manas, on the other hand, is far too close to the embodied and 
communis sensus  apparatus, as shown in the preceding parts, to be considered to be 
'mind' in any disembodiable or epiphenomenal sense. Nyaya’s atomistic atma (as 
distinct from the universalized al-pervasive Vedanta idealism of ‘one-mind’) is the 
same as Mimamsakas’ pluralism of atma, but the latter do not think of it as mind 
(rather only the recipient of sacrifice and liberation through Testimony). 
 
Last but not least, the Nyaya thesis is not able to give an adequate account against the 
Buddhists and Mimamsakas of the constituents and structure of cognition; Bimal 
Matilal toasted to Frege’s Bhartrharean adage: ‘cognition is shoot through with 
language’; but Jayanta’s analysis of the supposedly pre-linguistic  nir-vikalpa 
(inchoate, indeterminate) phase suggests that it is the same as savikalpa  (fully-blown, 
determinate) phase. Mohanty is still looking for pure intentionally amidst the chaos. It 
is very worrying indeed. Nyaya is not able to handle conceptual determinants qua 
concepts and this points to the biggest glaring hole in NandKishor’s Nyayafriendly- 
Mind. 
 
 Kaise kahoon manaki batiya…? (Gwaliagharana lyric) 
How can I tell you  (the unspoken speech of) my mind? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
